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Abstract. Suppose that a number of equally qualied agents want to choose col-
lectively an element from a set of alternatives dened by equality constraints. Each
agent may well prefer a dierent element, and the social choice problem consists
in deciding whether it is possible to design a rule to aggregate all the agents' pref-
erences into a social choice in an egalitarian way. In this paper we obtain criteria
that solve this problem in terms of conditions that are explicitly computable from
the constraints. As a theoretical consequence, we show that the only way to avoid
running into a social choice paradox consists in designing (if possible) the set of
alternatives satisfying certain optimality condition on the constraints, that is, in
the natural way from the point of view of economics.
Keywords. Social choice, optimization, rational design.
JEL classication codes. D71, C60, D63.
Introduction
Suppose that an element needs to be selected out of a set of alternatives X by a
number of agents, each of which may well want to choose a dierent one. In order
to make a collective decision it is necessary to provide some rule to aggregate the
individual preferences of the agents into a social one. Broadly speaking, the social
choice problem consists in deciding whether this aggregation process can be performed
in a socially acceptable manner or, more formally, whether there exist aggregation
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rules that satisfy certain axioms which are believed to capture whatever is meant by
\socially acceptable".
There are several approaches to the social choice problem in the literature. In
the Arrowian model [1] each agent orders all the elements of X and the aggregation
rule yields an ordering of the alternatives that, in order to be socially acceptable, is
essentially required to be compatible with the orderings established by the agents.
By contrast, in the model of Chichilnisky [5, 6] each agent just reveals her preferred
alternative from X and the aggregation rule is simply a function that takes as an
input the bundle of individual selections and produces as an output a single element
of X, the social or collective choice. Again, for this aggregation rule to be socially
acceptable it is required to satisfy certain axioms: it should be anonymous in the
sense that all the agents are equally considered; unanimous, which means that if
all agents happen to select the same alternative from X then this has to be also
the social choice; and continuous, a condition about which we shall say a few words
shortly. These axioms are described formally in Section 1.
In this paper we want to analyze the social choice problem over sets of alternatives
that are dened, as is often the case in quantitative economics, by means of a collection
of equality constraints gi(~x) = ci; that is,
(1) X = f~x 2 Rn : gi(~x) = ci for i = 1; : : : ;mg:
Such sets usually consist of a continuum of alternatives, so it does not seem reasonable
to require that the agents order all the alternatives as in the Arrowian model, but just
state their preferred one. Moreover, the continuity axiom becomes almost unavoidable
since it is natural to assume that an agent cannot distinguish between two suciently
close alternatives and, as a consequence, switching from one to the other should cause
only a small change in the aggregation function (see a detailed discussion following
[16, Remark 2.3.1, p. 6]). These observations strongly suggest that we work within
the model of Chichilnisky, and then our social choice problem boils down to the
following question: given a set of alternatives X as above, is it possible to nd an
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anonymous, unanimous and continuous aggregation rule over X? Notice that the
aggregation rule should be dened whatever the alternative chosen by each of the
agents, since there are no assumptions on how they perform their individual choices.
In particular, the agents are in principle independent from each other and may even
be completely irrational. It is important to keep this in mind to fully appreciate the
results obtained here, at least in their theoretical consequences.
The social choice problem was analyzed and solved, for a wide class of sets of
alternatives, by Eckmann [9, 10] in a mathematical guise1 and later on, in a social
choice context, by Chichilnisky and Heal [7] and Weinberger [22]. They showed
that, under certain hypotheses, the social choice problem has a solution if and only
if the set of alternatives X satises a mathematical condition called contractibility.
Although this solution is completely satisfactory from a mathematical point of view,
deciding whether a given set is contractible or not is still a very hard mathematical
problem. Also, the very notion of contractibility itself may probably be alien to
most readers. It seemed to us that these facts render the result of Chichilnisky and
Heal and Weinberger dicult to apply both in specic examples and in theoretical
investigations in economics, and our purpose in this paper is to obtain elementary
and explicitly computable criteria to analyze the social choice problem over sets X
dened by equality constraints. For the present expository purposes we shall just
state our main theorem (Theorem 3 in Section 1):
Main Theorem. Let X be dened as in (1). A necessary condition for the social
choice problem over X to have a solution is as follows: for any constraint gi(~x) = ci
such that the set Yi determined by the remaining constraints is bounded, ci must be
either the global maximum or the global minimum value that gi attains over Yi.
1Social choice functions may be regarded as some sort of generalized means. This point of view is
quite independent of any particular interpretation of the variables, and in this guise the social choice
problem already attracted mathematicians {for purely theoretical reasons{ in the rst part of the
past century. After the seminal paper of G. Aumann [2], several solutions for spaces satisfying certain
regularity conditions have been published [9, 11, 14]. The interested reader may enjoy Eckmann's
account of the history of the problem [10].
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The condition that Yi is bounded guarantees that gi indeed attains a global max-
imum and a global minimum value on Yi. What the theorem says is that unless ci
happens to coincide with either of these; that is, unless the constraint gi(~x) = ci is
optimal with respect to the others, the social choice problem over X has no solution.
Notice that in general this optimality condition may have to be satised by several
constraints simultaneously, since several of the Yi may be bounded (however, each of
the corresponding constraints gi(~x) = ci would have to be optimal over a dierent
set Yi), and notice also that the theorem tells us nothing about those constraints
for which Yi is not bounded. Finally, observe how the language used in the state-
ment of the theorem is completely elementary, making no reference to contractibility
whatsoever.
In addition to its applicability to specic examples, this result has a theoretical
interpretation that we feel valuable because it shows that there exists a surprising
relationship between the social choice problem and economics. We will now discuss
these two aspects in turn.
A) Application to specic examples. The necessary optimality condition aorded
by the main theorem can be used as a criterion to show that a given social choice
problem has no solution. When this is the case it is customary to speak of a social
choice paradox, since any procedure to perform collective choices will violate at least
one of the three axioms (unanimity, anonimity and continuity) laid out earlier and,
in that sense, will fail to be socially acceptable.
Example 1 below is included to illustrate how computations may proceed in a
typical case. We have deliberately chosen an example without any particular inter-
pretation because at this point we want to emphasize that the main theorem is purely
mathematical in nature and therefore completely independent of the interpretation
(if any) of the social choice problem under consideration.
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Example 1. Suppose that we want to analyze the social choice problem over the set
X  R3 dened as
X = f(x; y; z) 2 R3 : x4 + 2(y2 + 1)z2 + y2 = 1 ; 2x2   2y2 = 1g:
The set dened by the rst constraint alone (that is, removing the second con-
straint) is easily seen to be bounded. A computation using the method of Lagrange
multipliers shows that the second constraint is not optimal with respect to the rst
and therefore, according to our main theorem, the social choice problem over X has
no solution. 
Example 1 is therefore an instance of a social choice paradox, and some playing
around with the mathematics would lead to many more examples. None of these
would be very interesting, however, since they would not mean anything. By con-
trast, as soon as one considers examples whose variables and constraints have some
meaningful interpretation, the optimality criterion provided by the main theorem ac-
quires in turn an interesting interpretation which, in particular, brings economics into
the picture in a somewhat unexpected way. This is what we discuss now.
B) Theoretical consequences of the main theorem. Suppose, for the purpose of il-
lustration, that in Example 1 the rst constraint is exogenous in the sense that it
cannot be operated upon, but some agent (either the agents performing the choice
themselves or another, completely unrelated agent) can x the value c2 of the second
constraint; that is, the social choice problem can be designed to some extent. Then we
know that only setting that second constraint to be optimal with respect to the rst
will allow for the possibility of social choice on X. Thus optimization is a necessity
in designing a social choice problem if we want it to have a solution. We emphasize
that this is a purely mathematical conclusion, insofar as Example 1 was also purely
mathematical.
Now let us set ourselves in a context where the variables and the constraints have
an economical interpretation. For deniteness, assume that ~x represents the bundle of
production factors used by some rm. In general, of course, there will exist constraints
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on the bundles that can be used, maybe owing to technological limitations on the
production process, the necessity to satisfy a given demand, etc. These constraints
determine a set X from which the bundle of production factors has to be chosen. If
the rm is run by several agents, each one is entitled to her own preference and so
they are faced with a social choice problem over X. Will this problem have a solution,
as seems desirable? Let us consider, in turn, two particular cases:
(i) Imagine rst that the constraints represent technological limitations on the
productive process that are enforced by several laws of Nature. These constraints are
exogenous, in the sense that they cannot be operated upon. There is no reason to
expect that any of these constraints will be optimal with respect to the others2, and
so the main theorem implies that the social choice problem over X has no solution.
(ii) Suppose instead that there are only two constraints P (~x) = d and U(~x) = u
which represent the requirements that the rm satises a given demand d and obtains
certain level of utility u. We take the external demand d to be xed, so the rst
constraint is exogenous, but assume that the agents can choose the level of utility
u. Then our main theorem implies that if the agents want to allow themselves to
perform a collective choice of the bundle of production factors to be used then they
must x their utility level u to be either the best (or, quite paradoxically, the worst)
attainable while satisfying the given demand d. If there were additional technological
constraints as in (i), the conclusion would still be the same: the agents should x an
optimal level of utility u that satises the demand d and accords to the technological
constraints.
The conclusion of the previous paragraph is, by itself, hardly surprising for anyone
and almost axiomatic for an economist. The puzzling point is how the conclusion is
reached : we have just applied a mathematical theorem, as we did in Example 1, and
nowhere in our argumentation have we made any assumptions with an economical
content. As mentioned at the beginning of the paper when describing the social
2More quantitatively, since gijYi has exactly two global optimal values (or just one, if the maximum
and the minimum happen to coincide), the probability that ci actually agrees with any one of these
is zero.
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choice problem in the abstract, there are no conditions on how the agents choose
their preferred alternatives or how their individual utilities relate to each other3 or to
the utility U(~x) of the rm. In sum, there is no economics beyond the fact that the
variables and constraints have an economical interpretation. Our starting point was
just a bare problem in social choice but, nevertheless, in attempting to solve it we
have been led, by the mathematics alone, to the familiar condition that the level of
utility u should be optimal. This conclusion is economics, emerging spontaneously.
Mathematically it is nothing but the optimality condition from our main theorem
again, but now interpreted in an economical context, and to emphasize this we shall
refer to it as the condition of rationality in the design of the set of alternatives
X. This choice of terminology seems appropriate, given that optimization is one of
the distinguishing features of rationality. Summarizing, we may state the following
\principle of rational design":
A social choice problem that is not designed rationally has no solution.
Conversely, another result in this paper (Theorem 5) establishes the following:
A social choice problem that is designed rationally has, generically4, a solution.
We call these \principles" because they provide a general idea about how a social
choice problem should be designed (when possible) but, as always, their application
to each particular case has to be exercised with due care using the precise statements
of the theorems and observing that their hypotheses are satised.
Let us emphasize once again that we are considering rationality in the design of the
social choice problem, not rationality of the agents that make the collective decision.
In (i) above the latter may well be rational but, still, the social choice problem they
face has no solution because there was no rationality involved in its design (one could
even object to the use of the term \design" in that example, given that the constraints
came from laws of Nature). In (ii) the same agents making the collective decision
3In fact, their individual utilities appear nowhere in the social choice problem.
4The strict converse to the main theorem is not true in general, as shown in Example 12 in Section
4, thus the word \generically". Its precise meaning will be explained in Section 4; for the moment
it may be understood as \for almost every social choice problem that is rationally designed".
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could participate, to some extent, in the design of the social choice problem and
therefore avoid running into a social choice paradox. This is probably the situation
where the principle of rational design more clearly reproduces results that are familiar
in economics, as just seen. Still, yet another situation can arise: that in which the
problem can be designed but not by the agents making the decision themselves.
In that case we may be led to conclusions that cannot be interpreted in such a
straightforward way. As an illustration, consider the following:
(iii) Revisit example (i) above, but now suppose that the productive process is such
that the agents can, by combining the production factors in dierent proportions,
vary the level of pollution generated by the rm. Assume that the latter is xed by
the government, thereby adding a further constraint to those already in (i). By the
principle of rational design, unless the allowed level of pollution is the minimum or
the maximum allowed by the technological constraints, the agents running the rm
will again face a social choice paradox.
Now there is no economic reason5 to explain why the pollution level should be
minimized or maximized (subject to the technological constraints) but, still, this is
a necessary condition to allow for a socially acceptable aggregation rule. Thus we
see that there is a variety of situations where the principle of rational design can be
applied, sometimes leading to familiar conclusions and sometimes not.
Finally, it might be interesting to remark that the fact that no economics was in-
volved in our reasoning actually leaves a subtle trace: in (ii) we concluded that the
utility u had to be the global maximum or the global minimum allowed by the con-
straint on the demand, but we could not discriminate between the two. Mathematics
took us that far, but no more. This owes to the fact that, mathematically, both types
of extrema are on the same footing and there is no reason to discard one in favour
of the other. It is only economics that tells us that (in this case) the maximum is
desirable while the minimum is not. Something similar happens in (iii), where again
5At least within the variables and constraints contemplated in the social choice problem.
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the choice between the maximum or the minimum should be guided by considerations
which lie beyond mathematics.
Having seen how the results in this paper can be used both as practical criteria
to analyze specic examples and also as tools for more theoretical investigations, we
nish this Introduction with a brief account of how the paper is organized. In Section
1 we formally describe the model of social choice and the main theorem introduced
above. We also state an auxiliary result (Proposition 2) which provides a useful
criterion by itself. Since the proof of the main theorem is somewhat involved, we
have thought it convenient to introduce rst an outline of the main ideas that come
into play (we do this in Section 2) and then start with the proof proper (Section 3).
Some technical lemmas are postponed to appendices A and B. Up to Section 2 we
will be able to introduce the necessary mathematical background along the way, but
later on some notions from algebraic topology (homology theory and some duality
results) and dierential geometry will be needed. Suitable references will be included
where appropriate.
1. Statement of results
In this section we review very briey the basic elements of the social choice model
of Chichilnisky and give the formal statements of our results.
1.1. Basic denitions of the social choice model. Let k  2 be the number of
agents performing the collective choice over the set of alternatives X. As argued in
the Introduction, for us the preference of the ith agent will simply consist of a single
element pi 2 X (the favourite alternative of the agent) and an aggregation rule will
therefore be a mapping F (p1; p2; : : : ; pk) = p, where p 2 X is the collective choice.
Notice that the agents have absolute freedom in choosing their preferred alternative,
so F should be dened for any tuple (p1; p2; : : : ; pk) 2 X (k): : : X; that is, it should
be a mapping F : X (k): : : X  ! X. Also, in order for the aggregation rule F to be
socially acceptable it is required to satisfy the axioms of anonimity, unanimity and
continuity which, formally, read as follows:
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 Anonimity: F (p1; p2; : : : ; pk) should be independent of the ordering of the pi.
 Unanimity: F (p; p; : : : ; p) = p for every p 2 X.
 Continuity: F is a continuous mapping (notice that it makes sense to speak
of continuity since X is a subset of some Rn).
An aggregation rule F that satises the above three axioms is called a social choice
function over the given set of alternatives X. With this terminology, the social choice
problem is stated as follows: given a set of alternatives X, is it possible to nd a
social choice function over X?
When X is simple enough the existence of social choice functions can sometimes be
easily established directly. For example, when X is an interval of the real line then
the mean, the maximum and the minimum
F (p1; : : : ; pk) :=
1
k
kX
i=1
pi ; F (p1; : : : ; pk) = max
1ik
pi ; F (p1; : : : ; pk) = min
1ik
pi
are all well dened social choice functions. The mean is, more generally, a social
choice function over any convex set X  Rn, but it can no longer be assured to be
a suitable social choice function over sets X dened by equality constraints, which
are the ones of interest to us. The reason is that, as soon as some of the constraints
dening X are nonlinear6, the mean of two elements from X does not need to belong
to X. As another example, most auction methods (rst price, second price, etc.) also
satisfy the above axioms.
Recall that we speak of a social choice paradox whenever X does not admit a social
choice function. The classical example of such a set of alternatives X is the circum-
ference, a result obtained by Chichilnisky [5] when considering linear preferences on
the commodity space of bundles of two collective goods (the paper by Baigent [3]
contains a clear exposition of the main ideas and techniques involved in the proof).
Together with higher dimensional spheres and the Mobius band [4], these seem to be
6In passing, let us observe that if all the constraints dening X are linear then X is a convex subset
of Rn and therefore the social choice problem over X has a solution; namely, the mean. This does
not contradict our results because neither X nor any of the sets Y obtained by removing any one of
the constraints are bounded, being linear subspaces of Rn.
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the only examples ever considered in the literature. The methods presented in this
paper, because of their simplicity, greatly enlarge the variety of examples of social
choice paradoxes.
1.2. Our results. As mentioned earlier, we are interested in the social choice prob-
lem over sets of alternatives X  Rn that are dened by a collection of equality
constraints. Thus, let there be a collection of smooth maps g1; : : : ; gm : Rn  ! R
and values c1; : : : ; cm 2 R which determine the set of alternatives X as
X = f~x 2 Rn : gi(~x) = ci for every 1  i  mg:
The constraints can be completely arbitrary (in particular, they do not need to be
linear) but we shall always assume that the set of alternatives X they determine is
bounded, which is a reasonable requisite in most problems that try to capture some
aspect of reality. Of course, for the social choice problem to make sense X should
be nonempty. Also, if X is nite then the problem has a somewhat trivial answer in
the armative (see Section 4), so the case of interest is when X is actually innite.
A convenient way of encapsulating these considerations consists in requiring that the
number of constraints m is strictly smaller than the dimension of the ambient space
n; that is, m < n.
We will rst consider an auxiliary base case (which, however, has some interest
in itself) assuming that the gi satisfy the standard constraint qualications ; that is,
the gradients of the gi are linearly independent at each ~x 2 X. In this case we will
denitely run into a social choice paradox:
Proposition 2. Let the set of alternatives X be bounded, m < n, and assume that
the gi satisfy the constraint qualications. Then the social choice problem over X has
no solution.
The classical case when X is a sphere can be analyzed very easily using Proposition
2. An (n  1){dimensional sphere is described by a single (m = 1) implicit equation
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x21 + : : :+ x
2
n = 1 in Rn which evidently satises the constraint qualications. Hence
the social choice problem over spheres has no solution for n  2.
Now we move on to the precise statement of our main theorem. Observe that
Proposition 2 entails that, in order to have any hope of solving the social choice
problem over X, it is necessary that the gi do not satisfy the constraint qualications.
The simplest case is whenm 1 of the constraints (say, for deniteness, the rstm 1)
do satisfy them and it is only the addition of the remaining constraint what spoils
this condition. Thus, we shall assume that the gradients of g1; : : : ; gm 1 are linearly
independent at each point of the feasible set they determine
Y = Ym = f~x 2 Rn : g1(~x) = c1; : : : ; gm 1(~x) = cm 1g:
Having chosen the last constraint as the one on which we are going to focus, in the
sequel we shall safely omit the subindex from Ym and simply write Y without risk of
confusion. Then our main theorem reads as follows:
Theorem 3. Let the set Y be bounded and connected, m < n, and assume that
the rst m   1 constraints satisfy the constraint qualications.7 If the social choice
problem over X has a solution then the last constraint must be optimal with respect
to the remaining ones.
The connectedness assumption on Y means that it consists only of a single \piece"
and is included just for convenience: if Y is not connected, that is, if it consists of
several disjoint pieces, then the conclusion of the theorem is that cm must be the
global optimum value of gm restricted to one of those pieces.
The optimality condition provided by Theorem 3 is necessary, but in general not
sucient, to avoid a social choice paradox (see Example 12 in Section 4). However,
there is a second order condition which once again only involves notions familiar from
optimization theory and turns out to be enough to guarantee that the optimality
7Also, as a technical hypothesis, it is necessary to assume that gmjY has only nitely many critical
values. We shall explain this in detail later on.
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condition is indeed sucient. Construct the Lagrangian function
L(1; : : : ; m 1; ~x) = gm(~x) 
m 1X
i=1
i (gi(~x)  ci) ;
which corresponds to the optimization problem of nding the critical points of gm
subject to the rst m   1 constraints. The Hessian matrix of L with respect to all
its variables (the i and the xi) is called the bordered Hessian of the optimization
problem. Then:
Theorem 4. Let the set Y be bounded and connected, m < n, and assume that
the rst m   1 constraints satisfy the constraint qualications. Suppose that the last
constraint is indeed optimal with respect to the others. In addition, assume that the
bordered Hessian has a nonzero determinant at each point in X. Then the social
choice problem over X has a solution.
Applying this theorem may be dicult in practice, but in fact its interest is mainly
theoretical. This stems from the fact that the condition concerning the nonzero
determinant of the bordered Hessian is satised generically, in a sense to be explained
later on in Section 4. Thus we can state the following result:
Theorem 5. Let the set Y be bounded and connected, m < n, and assume that
the rst m   1 constraints satisfy the constraint qualications. Then a necessary
and, generically, sucient condition for the social choice problem over X to have a
solution is that the last constraint be optimal with respect to the remaining ones.
2. A rough outline of the proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 is somewhat complicated and we have thought it convenient
to include an outline of the basic ideas and diculties that it involves.
Since the spaces of alternatives X of interest to us go beyond the simple cases
of convex sets or spheres, there is no straightforward way of deciding whether there
exists a social choice function over and we need to resort to the beautiful result
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of Chichilnisky and Heal already mentioned in the Introduction, and whose precise
statement is the following [7, Theorem 1, p. 82]:
Theorem. Let the space of alternatives X be a paranite CW complex. A necessary
and sucient condition for the existence of social choice functions on X, for every
number of agents, is that each component of X is contractible.
In addition to the diculty of deciding whether a given space is contractible or not,
another issue that arises in applying the theorem of Chichilnisky and Heal concerns
the condition that X should be a paranite CW complex. Without entering into
the details, this technical condition means that X is suciently well behaved from a
topological point of view. For instance, any manifold M (with or without boundary)
is indeed a paranite CW complex because it can be triangulated, as shown by White-
head [23] or Whitney [24, Theorem 12A, p. 124]. Unfortunately, a set X dened by a
collection of constraints that do not satisfy the constraint qualications (as in Theo-
rem 3) may have a very complicated structure and in particular the characterization
of Chichilnisky and Heal may not be applicable. To circumvent this diculty we will
introduce the concept of homotopy social choice functions in Section 3.
We shall need the following two lemmas concerning the contractibility of manifolds:
Lemma 6. Let M be a compact manifold of dimension d  1 and without boundary.
Then none of the components of M is contractible.
Lemma 7. Let M be a compact contractible manifold of dimension d  2. Then its
boundary @M is nonempty (by the previous lemma) and connected.
In proving these results it seems unavoidable to make use of homology with real
coecients, which is a powerful tool from algebraic topology. Since this machinery
might not be familiar to the reader, we have postponed the proofs to Appendix A.
Let us continue by explaining briey the general scheme that will be followed to
prove Theorem 3. We will consider the whole family of social choice problems that
arise as cm runs in the real numbers, thus changing the set of alternatives X. To
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emphasize that cm now plays the role of a parameter we shall replace it by u and
reect this explicitly in the notation for X, letting
Xu = f~x 2 Rn : gi(~x) = ci for 1  i  m  1 and gm(~x) = ug:
This can be equivalently described as
Xu = f~x 2 Y : gm(~x) = ug;
where Y is the set dened by the rst (m  1) constraints as introduced earlier.
Recall that a point ~x 2 Y is called a critical point of the restricted map gmjY if
the gradient rgm(~x) is a linear combination of frg1(~x); : : : ;rgm 1(~x)g; that is, the
gradient of gm is a linear combination of the gradients of the constraints that dene
Y (notice that this is the classical necessary condition from the theory of Lagrange
multipliers for gmjY to reach a local extremum value at ~x). In that case u = gm(~x)
is said to be a critical value of gmjY . Equivalently, u is a critical value of gmjY if Xu
contains a critical point of gmjY . Otherwise u is said to be a regular value of gmjY .
(1) Consider rst the case when u is a regular value of gmjY . This amounts to saying
that the gradients of g1; : : : ; gm are all linearly independent at each ~x 2 Xu; that is,
they satisfy the constraint qualications. This is precisely the situation considered
in Proposition 2. Geometrically, this condition guarantees that (if nonempty) Xu is
a dierentiable manifold of dimension d = n m without boundary (see for instance
[8, Theorem 2.3, p. 213]) and in particular it is indeed a paranite CW complex as
mentioned earlier. Thus we can directly apply the theorem of Chichilnisky and Heal
and reduce the problem to deciding whether the components ofXu are contractible. In
Proposition 2 we assumedXu to be bounded and innite. The rst condition, together
with the fact that Xu is closed in Rn (because it is the preimage of (c1; c2; : : : ; u) via
the continuous map g = (g1; : : : ; gm) : Rn  ! Rm), entails that Xu is compact. The
second condition implies that the dimension d of Xu is at least 1, since otherwise
Xu would consist only of nitely many points. Therefore we can apply Lemma 6 to
M = Xu to learn that none of the components of Xu is contractible, and we conclude
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that the social choice problem over Xu has no solution. This proves Proposition 2,
settling the case when u is a regular value of gmjY .
It follows from the previous paragraph that only when u is a critical value of gmjY
there is some hope for the social choice problem over Xu to have a solution. Saying
that u is a critical value of gmjY means that there exists a critical point ~x 2 Xu, which
by denition satises the classical necessary condition from the theory of Lagrange
multipliers for gmjY to reach a local extremum value at ~x. However, it is well known
that this is not a sucient condition, in that ~x could very well be a saddle point (so
that u would be neither a local maximum value nor a local minimum value) or, even
if it is indeed a local extremum, it does not need to be a global one. This is why
Theorem 3 is not a straightforward consequence of Proposition 2: we have to rule
out all the possibilities just described and conclude that u must in fact be a global
optimum of gmjY .
To illustrate this let us refer back to Example 1. The method of Lagrange mul-
tipliers shows that there are actually six critical points and three critical values of
g2jY , which are u = 2 (the global optima of g2jY ) and u = 0. For these three values
of u Proposition 2 tells us nothing about the social choice problem on Xu, since the
constraints do not satisfy the constraint qualications. A ner analysis is needed to
show that also for u = 0 the social choice problem over Xu has no solution. This ner
analysis is precisely the content of Theorem 3.
(2) Let us sketch now how the proof of Theorem 3 goes. We need to prove that,
if there exists a social choice function over Xu, then u is either the global maximum
umax or the global minimum umin of gmjY (these global optima exist as consequence of
the assumption that Y is bounded, and hence compact). We already know by (1) that
u must be a critical value of gmjY and, in particular, this implies that now we cannot
guarantee that Xu is a manifold (nor a CW complex, in fact) and therefore we cannot
apply the theorem of Chichilnisky and Heal directly. To overcome this diculty we
need to make a rather lengthy detour. The argument will be by contradiction, so
suppose that there exists a social choice function over Xu but umin < u < umax. Pick
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two numbers u1 and u2 such that umin < u1 < u < u2 < umax and consider the
auxiliary set
X[u1;u2] = f~x 2 Y : u1  gm(~x)  u2g:
With a suitable choice of u1 and u2 the set X[u1;u2] can be shown to be a compact
manifold with boundary. In fact, its boundary @X[u1;u2] is the union of the two disjoint
sets
Xu1 = f~x 2 Y : gm(~x) = u1g and Xu2 = f~x 2 Y : gm(~x) = u2g:
We will prove that:
(i) The social choice function that exists over Xu by assumption can \almost" be
extended to another one dened on all X[u1;u2] (Proposition 9).
(ii) As a consequence of (i) and the theorem of Chichilnisky and Heal applied to
the manifold X[u1;u2], it follows that the latter must be contractible (Lemma
8).
(iii) But, since umin < u1 < u < u2 < umax, both sets Xu1 and Xu2 are nonempty
and therefore the boundary of X[u1;u2] is not connected, having at least two
pieces. This entails that X[u1;u2] cannot be contractible (Lemma 7).
A contradiction arises between (ii) and (iii), proving that the assumption that
umin < u < umax is untenable and so u must be a global optimum value of gmjY .
The word \almost" in (i) owes to the following: while it may not always be possible
to extend a social choice function originally dened only on Xu to a social choice
function dened on the larger set X[u1;u2], it is always possible to extend it at the ho-
motopy level. This is what prompts the denition of homotopy social choice function
mentioned earlier, a notion which is slightly weaker than that of a true social choice
function, but still good enough for our purposes.
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3. Proof of Theorem 3
As a technical assumption we require that gmjY has at most nitely many critical
values8, a condition that will be fullled in any problem with a reasonable economical
interpretation. For instance, whenever gm is an analytic function (polynomials being
the simplest case) this condition is automatically satised.
Note. For the sake of brevity, from now on we shall sometimes abbreviate \social
choice function" as SCF.
3.1. Homotopy social choice functions. Let us rst recast the conditions of una-
nimity and anonimity in a slightly dierent {but well known{ equivalent way. Suppose
F is an SCF for k agents on a space of alternatives X. Denote by the letter  the
diagonal map
 : X  ! Xk ; (p) = (p; p; : : : ; p)
and by the letter P any permutation map P : Xk  ! Xk. The conditions of una-
nimity (U) and anonimity (A) on F can then be equivalently stated as
(U) F  = id,
(A) F  P = F .
As it turns out, the argument given by Chichilnisky and Heal to prove that the ex-
istence of social choice functions for any number of agents implies that the preference
space is contractible works equally well if (U) and (A) only hold at the homotopy
level; that is, if they are replaced by
(HU) F  ' id,
(HA) F  P ' F for any permutation P : Xk  ! Xk.
The reason is that, when one considers the maps F ,  and P  induced by F ,
 and P between homotopy groups, unanimity (U) and its homotopical counterpart
(HU) yield the same relation F    = id, and the same goes for (A) and (HA)
8It might be convenient to recall the distinction between critical points and critical values: since
many critical points may correspond to the same critical value, gmjY may well have innitely many
critical points in spite of having only nitely many critical values as required.
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(namely, F   P  = F ). Since it is only these relations that are needed to conclude
that X is contractible, our assertion follows.
For the sake of brevity let us call a continuous map F : Xk  ! X a homotopy SCF
(for k agents) if it satises conditions (HU) and (HA) above. These functions are not
to be interpreted in any economical sense, but just as mathematical objects that will
be useful to prove Theorem 3. Our discussion may be summed up in the following
Lemma 8. Let M be a compact manifold. Assume there exist homotopy social choice
functions over M for any number of agents. Then M is contractible.
3.2. An extension result. Now we are going to establish the extension result that
is key in proving Theorem 3; namely, that an SCF on Xu can be extended to a
homotopical SCF on X[u1;u2].
Let u be a critical value of gmjY and suppose that it is not a global optimum,
so that umin < u < umax. As a consequence of the technical assumption that gmjY
only has nitely many critical values we may choose u1; u2 2 [umin; umax] such that
u1 < u < u2 and u is the only critical value of gmjY on the interval [u1; u2].
Proposition 9. Let u1 and u2 be chosen as above. If there exists a social choice
function F for k agents on Xu, then there exists a homotopy social choice function
F 0 for k agents on X[u1;u2].
The proof of the proposition needs Lemmas 10 and 11, which we state now. Their
proofs are postponed to Appendix B, since they are slightly technical.
Lemma 10. There exist a neighbourhood U of Xu in X[u1;u2] and a continuous func-
tion FU : U
k  ! X[u1;u2] with the properties
(1) FU(p; : : : ; p) = p,
(2) FU(p1; : : : ; pk) is independent of the ordering of the pi.
Notice that FU is close to being an SCF on U (it is certainly unanimous and
anonymous), but it does not qualify as such because its target space is X[u1;u2] rather
than U .
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Lemma 11. Given any neighbourhood U of Xu in X[u1;u2] there exists a continuous
mapping r : X[u1;u2]  ! X[u1;u2] such that:
(1) r(p) 2 U for every p 2 X[u1;u2],
(2) r is homotopic to the identity in X[u1;u2].
We are going to put these two results together to prove Proposition 9.
Proof of Proposition 9. Apply Lemma 10 to nd U and FU ; then apply Lemma 11 to
the U just obtained to get r. Dene F 0 : Xk[u1;u2]  ! X[u1;u2] by
F 0(p1; : : : ; pk) := FU(r(p1); : : : ; r(pk)):
Notice that the denition is correct: all the r(pi) belong to U and therefore it makes
sense to evaluate FU on the k{tuple (r(p1); : : : ; r(pk)).
We claim that F 0 is a homotopy SCF on X[u1;u2]. Clearly F
0 is insensitive to the
ordering of its arguments because the same is true of FU , so (HA) holds. Also,
composing F 0 with the diagonal map (p) = (p; : : : ; p) yields
F 0 (p) = FU(r(p); : : : ; r(p)) = r(p);
and since r ' id in X[u1;u2], we see that
F 0  ' id:
This establishes property (HU) and shows that F 0 is indeed a homotopy SCF. 
3.3. The proof of Theorem 3. We are nally ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. The hypothesis that Y is connected implies that gm(Y ) is a
connected subset of R, and so it must be an interval. Thus gm(Y ) is the interval
[umin; umax]. As already mentioned we reason by contradiction, so assume that umin <
u < umax and there exists an SCF over Xu. By Proposition 2 u must be a critical
value of gmjY . As we did before, we may choose u1 and u2 in the interval [umin; umax]
such that u1 < u < u2 and u is the only critical value of gmjY in the interval [u1; u2].
Notice that X[u1;u2] is a manifold, because both u1 and u2 are regular values of gmjY .
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Its dimension is the same as that of Y , which is d = n  (m  1)  2 because of the
condition m < n. As in the proof of Proposition 2, X[u1;u2] is compact.
By Proposition 9 the SCF that exists over Xu can be extended to a homotopical
SCF on X[u1;u2] and, as a consequence of Lemma 8, it follows that X[u1;u2] is con-
tractible. Then by Lemma 7 its boundary @X[u1;u2] has to be connected. However,
this boundary is the disjoint union of Xu1 and Xu2 , both of which are nonempty
because both u1 and u2 belong to gm(Y ). This contradiction nishes the proof. 
4. On the sufficiency of the optimality condition
Let us begin by presenting an example that illustrates how the optimality condition
of Theorem 3 is generally not sucient to avoid a social choice paradox:
Example 12. Consider the set of alternatives
X = f(x; y; z) 2 R3 : (x2 + y2 + z2 + 3)2   16(x2 + y2) = 0 ; z = 1g:
It turns out that the second constraint is optimal with respect to the rst one,
so the necessary condition provided by the main theorem is satised.9 Substituting
z = 1 in (x2+y2+z2+3)2 16(x2+y2) = 0 and rearranging terms yields the implicit
equation x2+ y2 = 4, so X is actually a circumference of radius 2 centered at (0; 0; 1)
and contained in the plane z = 1. But circumferences are the prototype of a set of
alternatives that does not admit a social choice function, so we conclude that the
social choice problem over X has no solution. 
In spite of the previous example, it is often the case that when a constraint is
optimal with respect to the others the set of alternatives X actually reduces to a
nite number of points, and in this case there do exist social choice functions over
X. To see why, begin by labelling the alternatives (that is, the elements of X) in
any order. Then, given the bundle of individual preferences (p1; : : : ; pk), simply let
F (p1; : : : ; pk) be that alternative, among those that appear in (p1; : : : ; pk), having
9The set Y2 dened by the second constraint alone is not bounded, so the main theorem does not
require the rst constraint to be optimal with respect to the second one.
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the highest label. It is easy to check that F satises the three axioms of anonimity,
unanimity and continuity10 and is therefore a social choice function over X. (It
is, however, questionable to what extent such a function is actually of interest in the
realm of social choice.) This very simple observation lies at the heart of both Theorem
4 and Theorem 5.
4.1. The proof of Theorem 4. The strategy consists in showing that, under the
hypotheses of the theorem, X is indeed nite and therefore admits an SCF as just
shown.
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider the constrained optimization problem
(P ) :
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
optimize gm(~x)
subject to g1(~x) = c1
...
gm 1(~x) = cm 1
Let ~x0 be a point in X. Since by assumption the constraint gm(~x) = cm is optimal
with respect to the remaining ones, ~x0 is a solution to (P ) and, in particular, it must
satisfy the standard rst order conditions of constrained optimization. Although
we know that ~x0 is a global, and hence local, optimum of gmjY , let us pretend for a
second that we ignore this and classify ~x0 using the second order criterion appropriate
to optimization under constraints.
Denote D2~xL the matrix of second partial derivatives of the Lagrangian L with
respect to ~x and consider the quadratic form q that results from restricting D2~xL to the
nullspace of the Jacobian matrix of the constraints (g1; : : : ; gm 1). Of course, all the
derivatives should be evaluated at the point of interest, ~x0. Then (see [8, Theorem 8.9,
p. 154]), depending on whether q is indenite, negative denite, or positive denite,
we conclude that gmjY has either a saddle point, a strict local maximum, or a strict
10Notice the vacuous role of the continuity axiom, owing to the fact that any function is continuous
on any nite subset of Euclidean space.
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local minimum at ~x0. If q is only semidenite, we cannot conclude anything about
the nature of ~x0.
According to the theory of restricted quadratic forms, q can be classied in terms
of the matrix D2~xL bordered with the Jacobian of the gi, and this matrix is nothing
but the bordered Hessian. The assumption that the latter has a nonzero determinant
implies that q is either indenite or denite, but not semidenite [20, Theorem 16.4,
p. 389]. Thus the second order criterion allows us to classify ~x0 as either a saddle
point or a strict (local) optimum. However, as mentioned in the rst paragraph, ~x0
is certainly not a saddle point because it is a global optimum, so it must be a strict
optimum. The word \strict" is crucial here: it implies that ~x0 has a neighbourhood
U in Y such that gmjU attains the value cm at ~x0 and only at ~x0. Since this is true for
every ~x0 2 X and X is compact, it follows that gm(~x) = cm only has nitely many
solutions on Y or, otherwise stated, that X is actually a nite set. 
It is worthwhile to interpret the proof of Theorem 4 in the context of Morse func-
tions, since we will then be able to generalize it to a proof of Theorem 5. This is the
goal of the following two subsections.
4.2. Morse functions. Hidden in the proof of Theorem 4 is the concept of non-
degeneracy of a critical point, whose abstract denition is as follows. Let M be a
compact, boundariless manifold, and let h : M  ! R be a smooth function. A crit-
ical point p 2 M for h is said to be nondegenerate if the matrix of second partial
derivatives of h at p has a nonzero determinant11. The map h itself is called a Morse
function if all its critical points are nondegenerate.
In the case of Theorem 4 the manifold M is Y , which is a smooth compact sub-
manifold of Rn, and h is the restriction of the globally dened map gm to Y , that
is, h = gmjY . The matrix of second partial derivatives of h = gmjY is the matrix of
the restricted quadratic form q (this is not entirely obvious, since q was constructed
11One would express h in local coordinates around p and construct the matrix of second partial
derivatives of this local expression. Whether or not this matrix has a nonzero determinant turns
out to be independent of the coordinates chosen, and this makes the above denition valid. The
interested reader can nd more information about this in [17, Chapter 2, pp. 33.]
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from the Lagrangian rather than directly from gm, but see equation (3) in [8, p.
290]). With this language, the condition that the bordered Hessian has a nonzero
determinant at each ~x 2 X amounts to requiring that every critical point of gmjY is
nondegenerate, that is, that gmjY is a Morse function.
By their very denition, nondegenerate critical points of a map h have the property
that the quadratic term in the Taylor expansion of h around them is either denite
or indenite, but not semidenite. In particular, regardless of the nature of the
critical point (whether a saddle or a local optimum), it is isolated in the sense that
it has neighbourhood U that contains no other critical point. As a consequence, a
Morse function on a compact manifold M can only have nitely many critical points
altogether (see for instance [17, Corollary 2.19, p. 47]). This is reminiscent of the
proof of Theorem 4 and, in fact, we may now rephrase the latter as follows:
Theorem 40. Let the set Y be bounded and connected, m < n, and assume that
the rst m   1 constraints satisfy the constraint qualications. Suppose that the last
constraint is indeed optimal with respect to the others. In addition, assume that gmjY
is a Morse function. Then the social choice problem over X has a solution.
Proof. Every point in X is a critical point of gmjY because of the assumption about
the optimality of the last constraint with respect to the others. Since Morse functions
on compact manifolds have only nitely many critical points, it follows that X is nite
and so the social choice problem over X has a solution. 
Yet another property of Morse functions of interest to us is that they are \generic"
in the set C1(M;R) of all smooth functions h : M  ! R (together with the above
reformulation of Theorem 4, these will be the main ingredients in the proof of Theorem
5). More precisely, combining [17, Lemma 2.26, p. 52] and [17, Theorem 2.20, p. 47]
one has:
Theorem. For a compact, boundariless, smooth manifold M , the set of Morse
functions is open and dense in C1(M;R) in the strong C2{topology.
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The strong C2{topology on C1(M;R) can be most easily described by saying that
two functions h1; h2 2 C1(M;R) are {close when the functions themselves, together
with their derivatives up to second order, dier by no more than  at each point ofM .
We will write kh1   h2k <  to denote this.12 Equivalently, a sequence hn converges
to h if and only if the maps hn, together with their partial derivatives up to second
order, converge uniformly to h and its corresponding partial derivatives.
4.3. The proof of Theorem 5. Let us begin by explaining more carefully the state-
ment of the theorem. Consider once more the bounded set Y dened by the rstm 1
constraints alone. These should be thought of as being xed once and for all, and
we imagine that the last constraint gm(~x) = cm is a parameter so that the map gm
and the number cm can vary, yielding a whole family of sets of alternatives X
cm
gm .
However, since we are only interested in the case when the last constraint is optimal
with respect to the others, for each map gm there are only two possible choices of cm:
either the global maximum cmaxm or the global minimum c
min
m of gmjY . The content of
Theorem 5 is that for most choices of gm both possibilities lead to a set of alternatives
where the social choice problem has a solution.
Let us formalize this idea. For any smooth map gm : Rn  ! R denote cmaxm =
max gmjY and cminm = min gmjY (since Y is bounded by assumption, these two
numbers are well dened) and consider the two sets of alternatives
Xmaxgm = f~x 2 Rn : g1(~x) = c1; : : : ; gm 1(~x) = cm 1; gm(~x) = cmaxm g
and
Xmingm = f~x 2 Rn : g1(~x) = c1; : : : ; gm 1(~x) = cm 1; gm(~x) = cminm g:
With this notation, the precise statement of Theorem 5 is the following:
Theorem 50. Let the set Y be bounded and connected, m < n, and assume that
the rst m   1 constraints satisfy the constraint qualications. There is a set M 
12Since the derivatives depend on the coordinates chosen to compute them, this denition has to
be set up with some care, but we have no need to go any further into these details. The interested
reader is referred to [17, p. 51].
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C1(Rn;R) which is open and dense (with the strong C2{topology) and such that, when
gm belongs to this set, the social choice problems over both X
max
gm and X
min
gm admit a
solution.
Proof. Consider the set
M = fg 2 C1(Rn;R) : gjY is a Morse functiong:
According to Theorem 40, whenever gm belongs to M the social choice problem
over both Xmaxgm and X
min
gm has a solution. Therefore, we only need to show that M
is open and dense in C1(Rn;R). Since we will work in C1(Y;R) and in C1(Rn;R)
simultaneously, we denote their respective distances by k  kY and k  k.
(1) Openness. Pick a map g 2 M; that is, a smooth map g : Rn  ! R such that
gjY is a Morse function. Since Morse functions form an open subset of C1(Y;R) as
discussed at the end of the previous section, there exists  > 0 such that any other
smooth map h0 : Y  ! R satisfying kgjY   h0kY <  is also a Morse function. Now,
given any smooth h : Rn  ! R such that kg hk < , setting h0 = hjY one evidently
has kgjY   h0kY  kg   hk <  and so hjY is also a Morse function, that is, h 2 M.
Hence M is open in C1(Rn;R).
(2) Density. We have to show that given any g 2 C1(Rn;R) and any  > 0 there
is h 2 C1(Rn;R) such that kg   hk <  and hjY is a Morse function. Consider the
restriction gjY . By the density of Morse functions in C1(Y;R) mentioned earlier there
is a Morse function h0 : Y  ! R such that kg   h0kY < . Extend h0 to a smooth
~h0 : Rn  ! R and nd an open neighbourhood U of Y in Rn such that kg   ~h0k < 
on U . Choose an even smaller neighbourhood V of Y such that V  U and a smooth
bump function  : Rn  ! [0; 1] such that jV  1 and   0 outside U . Finally, let
h :=   ~h0+ (1 )  g. This is a smooth function dened on Rn that coincides with
h0 on Y ; therefore, hjY is a Morse function. As for the distance between g and h, we
have:
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(i) on V the equality h = ~h0 holds, so
kg   hkV = kg   ~h0kV < ;
(ii) on U   V
kg   hkU V = kg    ~h0   (1 )  gkU V = (sup
U V
jj)  kg   ~h0kU V < ;
(iii) outside U the equality   0 holds, so
kg   hkUc = kg   gkUc = 0:
Therefore kg   hk <  on all of Rn, proving that M is dense in C1(Rn;R). 
5. Appendix A: proofs of Lemmas 6 and 7
In this appendix we establish Lemmas 6 and 7. As mentioned earlier, we need to
use some homology theory. Since this topic is rather elaborate we cannot even recall
here the basic denitions, so we refer the interested reader to the book by Hatcher
[13] and limit ourselves to state the results that we need.
To any space U we may assign a sequence of (real) vector spaces Hj(U ;R) for j =
0; 1; 2; : : : which capture some geometric information about U . These are called the j{
dimensional homology groups of U (even though they are actually vector spaces) with
coecients in the real numbers. For simplicity we shall just speak of the homology
groups of U and denote them Hj(U), supressing R from the notation.
The following properties hold:
(a) The dimension of H0(U) is the number of path connected components of U .
(b) If U is contractible, then H0(U) = R and Hj(U) = f0g for every j  1.
(c) Poincare duality: if U is a compact, boundariless manifold of dimension d,
then Hj(U) = Hd j(U) for every j.
With these properties, the proof of Lemma 6 reduces to a simple computation:
Proof of Lemma 6. Let U be a connected component ofM . Then U is itself a compact
manifold of dimension d  1 and without boundary. We have H0(U ;R) = R by (a)
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above, because U is connected. By Poincare duality Hd(U ;R) = H0(U ;R) = R, and
it follows from (b) that U is not contractible, because it has a homology group of
dimension  1 (namely, its d{dimensional homology group) which is nonzero. 
The proof of the second lemma requires slightly more sophisticated tools. We
need to use relative homology groups, which are dened not just for a space U but
for a pair (U;U0) formed by a space U and a subset U0 of U . That is, for each
j = 0; 1; 2; : : : there is a real vector space Hj(U;U0) called the j{dimensional relative
homology group of the pair (U;U0) with coecients in the real numbers. There is a
relation between the relative homology of a pair (U;U0) and the homology groups of
both U and U0, which is expressed by a so-called long exact sequence as follows. For
each dimension j there are linear maps Hj(U0)  ! Hj(U), Hj(U)  ! Hj(U;U0) and
Hj(U;U0)  ! Hj 1(U0) that t into a sequence
: : :  ! H2(U)  ! H2(U;U0)  ! H1(U0)  ! H1(U)  ! H1(U;U0)  ! 0
(which continues to the left in the same fashion) having the property of being exact :
the image of the map entering any one of the terms of the sequence coincides with
the kernel of the map connecting that term to the one to its right.
In addition to this, we shall also make use of
(d) Lefschetz duality: if M is a compact manifold (with boundary) of dimension
d, then Hj(M;@M) = Hd j(M) for every j.
Proof of Lemma 7. By Lefschetz duality H1(M;@M) = Hd 1(M). The latter homol-
ogy group is zero by (b), because M is contractible and d  1  1, so H1(M;@M) is
zero too. Also, again by (b) we have that H0(M) = R.
Consider the following portion of the long exact sequence for the pair (M;@M):
H1(M;@M)
 ! H0(@M)  ! H0(M)  ! 0:
Since H1(M;@M) = f0g, the image of  is zero and, by the exactness of the sequence,
the map connecting H0(@M) to H0(M) has zero kernel. It is therefore injective. In
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a similar fashion one proves that it is surjective, now analyzing what happens with
the arrow H0(M) to 0. Hence it is an isomorphism, which shows that H0(@M) =
H0(M) = R. Using (a) we conclude that @M is connected. 
6. Appendix B: proofs of Lemmas 10 and 11
In this section, and to unclutter the notation, we shall denote the elements of Xu
and Y with letters p; q; : : : instead of vectors ~x; ~y; : : : as before.
6.1. Proof of Lemma 10. It is both notationally and conceptually simpler to prove
a slightly more general result, from which Lemma 10 follows letting M = X[u1;u2] and
Z = Xu:
Lemma 13. Let M be a compact manifold and Z M a closed subset of M . Suppose
F : Zk  ! Z is an SCF over Z. Then there exist a neighbourhood U of Z in M and
a continuous map FU : U
k  !M such that FU is unanimous and anonymous.
Proof. Think of F as a mapping F : Zk  !M and extend it setting F (p; : : : ; p) = p
for every p 2M . Now its domain is
D := Zk [ f(p; : : : ; p) : p 2Mg;
which is a compact subset of Mk. Clearly F is still continuous on this new larger
domain D.
Consider the quotient space obtained from Mk by identifying, via an equivalence
relation , each k{tuple (p1; : : : ; pk) with all of its permutations. We shall denote
 : Mk  ! Mk=  the canonical projection. The set D projects onto a compact
subset (D) of Mk= . In turn the map F , due to its invariance under permutation
of its arguments, descends to a continuous map
F : (D)  !M:
Now we make use of the following extension result: every continuous map from a
closed subset of a metric space into a manifold M can be extended to a continuous
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map dened on a neighbourhood W of the subset (see for instance [15, Proposition
8.3, p. 47]). Applying this result to the closed subset (D) of the metric space
Mk=  and the map F we see that the latter can be extended continuously to a
neighbourhood W of (D) in Mk= . For notational ease the extension will still be
denoted F .
The set  1(W ) is a neighbourhood of D in Mk, so in particular it is a neighbour-
hood of Zk. It is easy to see that there exists a neighbourhood U of Z in M such
that Uk   1(W ). Then the map
FU : U
k  !M ; FU(p1; : : : ; pk) = ( F  )(p1; : : : ; pk)
provides the desired extension: it is clearly continuous and unanimous, and it is also
anonymous because any two permutations of a k{tuple (p1; : : : ; pk) are projected by
 onto the same element of Mk= . 
6.2. Proof of Lemma 11. The construction of the map r is rather indirect: we shall
dene a tangent vectoreld on Y , consider the ow ' that it generates and then use
' to dene r. This approach is closely related to Morse theory, and a quick glance
at the book by Milnor [18, pp. 12 and 13] may be useful. Some acquaintance with
dierential geometry is required to follow the argument.
Recall that Y  Rn is a dierentiable manifold dened by the constraints gi(p) = ci
for i = 1; 2; : : : ;m   1. At any point p 2 Y their gradients are all orthogonal to Y
or, otherwise stated, the tangent space to Y at p is the subspace of Rn orthogonal to
all the frgi(p) : 1  i  m   1g. Denote V (p) the projection of rgm(p) onto that
tangent space, thus obtaining a tangent vectoreld p 7! V (p) on Y . This vectoreld
V (p) can be given a very rough but rather helpful intuitive interpretation: inasmuch
as rgm(p) tells us the direction along which f increases most quickly, its projection
V (p) tells us in what direction we should advance to obtain the quickest increase of
gm while remaining in Y .
Assertion 1. V (p) is zero precisely when p is a critical point of gmjY .
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Proof. Notice that V (p) is zero precisely when rgm(p) is orthogonal to Y at p; that
is to say, precisely when rgm(p) is a linear combination of the gradients frgi(p) :
1  i  m  1g or, equivalently, when p is a critical point of gmjX . 
Assertion 2. The scalar product rgm(p)  V (p) is always nonnegative and it is
actually positive when p is not a critical point of gmjY .
Proof. Observe that by construction the angle between rgm(p) and V (p) is at most
ninety degrees, so the scalar product rgm(p)  V (p) is always nonnegative. Together
with Assertion 1, this proves the result. 
Using V (p) we dene a new tangent vectoreld W : p 7! (u   gm(p))V (p). Let
' : Y R  ! Y be the ow generated on Y by the vectoreld W . Notice that, since
Y is compact, ' is globally dened.
At this point it may be helpful to have a look at Figure 1. Panel (a) shows a very
simple set of alternatives Y in R3 dened by a single restriction, so Y is a surface.
The remaining constraint gm in this case is taken to be gm(x; y; z) = z. The Z axis
is represented vertically, so the level set Xu is simply the intersection of Y with the
horizontal plane at height u. The gradient of gmjX is the vertical vector (0; 0; 1),
which is perpendicular to Y precisely at the two points p and q (and possibly others
not shown in the picture); these are, then, critical points13. Since p belongs to Xu, we
see that u is not a regular a value of gmjY and we cannot expect Xu to be manifold.
And indeed, as shown in the drawing, Xu is an \eight-gure" (two circumferences
having a single point in common) so it is not a manifold. By contrast, u1 and u2 are
regular values of gmjX since Xu1 and Xu2 do not contain critical points, and they are
both manifolds.
Let us focus our attention on the set X[u1;u2], which is the whole region of Y
comprised between heights u1 and u2. It is also a manifold, this time with boundary.
Panel (b) shows X[u1;u2] together with an sketch ofW (p) and '. We mentioned earlier
13Notice that q is a local minimum but p is neither a local maximum nor a local minimum (it is a
saddle point). This is related to the fact that being a critical point is a necessary but not sucient
condition for being a local optimum, as already highlighted in Section 2.
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that V (p) points, at each p 2 X, in the direction that we should follow, moving within
Y , to obtain the quickest increase of gm. Given that gm(x; y; z) = z, in our case V (p)
points in the direction of quickest ascent along Y from p. The vector eld W (p) is
obtained multiplying V (p) by the modulating factor u gm(p), which is zero precisely
on Xu, negative above Xu and positive below Xu. Taking into account these signs,
W (p) is zero on Xu, points in the direction of quickest descent if p is above Xu, and
points in the direction of quickest ascent if p is belowXu. The small arrows to the right
of panel (b) in Figure 1 are intended to convey this idea. If we follow the directions
of these arrows, starting at any point p, it seems clear that we will move towards
Xu advancing ever more slowly, since W (p) (which is our speed) becomes smaller the
closer we get to Xu. Unless p 2 Xu, in which case we would actually stay still since
W (p) = 0, we would approach Xu asymptotically but never get there. In any case,
there will be a nite time tp at which we will enter any prescribed neighbourhood U
of Xu and never leave it again. The map r that we are looking for will essentially be
dened as r(p) = the point we reach at time tp. In our trip from p to r(p) we might
follow a simple path like the ones shown to the left side of the drawing or, possibly,
a much more complicated one which approaches Xu spiralling around it or in some
other strange fashion.
Let us go back to mathematics again. The following proposition collects some
properties of ' that are the formal counterparts of the ideas just described:
Proposition 14. The ow ' has the following properties:
(1) For every q 2 X[u1;u2] and every t  0, the point '(q; t) belongs to X[u1;u2] too.
(2) For every neighbourhood U of Xu in X[u1;u2] there exists T > 0 such that
'(q; t) 2 U for every q 2 X[u1;u2] and every t  T .
In the parlance of dynamical systems, (1) means that X[u1;u2] is positively invariant
under ' and (2) states that Xu is a stable attractor in X[u1;u2]. As a preparation to
prove the proposition we are going to investigate some qualitative properties of the
trajectories of '.
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p
q
u1
u
u2
Xu
(a) Setup for Lemma 11
X[u1;u2]
(b) The vector eld W and the ow '
Figure 1.
Fix a point q 2 X[u1;u2] and let  be the trajectory of ' with initial condition
(0) = q (in terms of the ow, (t) = '(q; t)). More explicitly,  : R  ! Y is a
smooth curve in Y which satises (0) = q and
d
dt
(t) = W ((t))
for every t 2 R (that is,  is an integral curve of the vectoreldW ). We are interested
in the behaviour of (t) for t  0, and for deniteness we consider the case u < f(q) 
u2.
Assertion 3. The inequality u < gm((t)) holds for every t 2 R.
Proof. Each point of Xu is a zero ofW and therefore a xed point of the ow '. Since
the trajectory  goes through the point q, which does not belong to Xu, it follows
that (t) 62 Xu for every t 2 R. Consider the map t 7! (gm  )(t). By what we have
just seen, it never attains the value u, so (as it continuous) it must be the case that
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gm((t)) is either always > u or < u. Since we have taken gm(q) > u, it follows that
gm((t)) 6= u for every t 2 R. 
Assertion 4. The inequality gm((t))  u2 holds for every t  0.
Proof. Using the chain rule we compute the time derivative of the map t 7! (gm)(t)
as follows:
d
dt
(gm  )(t) = rgm((t))  d
dt
(t) = rgm((t)) W ((t));
and since by denition W (p) = (u   gm(p))V (p), we have rgm(p)  W (p) = (u  
gm(p))rgm(p)  V (p), so
(2)
d
dt
(gm  )(t) = (u  gm((t)))rgm((t))  V ((t)):
The right hand side is the product of two factors. The rst is u fm((t)), which is
strictly negative by the previous assertion, and the second is rgm((t))  V ((t))  0
which is nonnegative by Assertion 2. Thus the derivative of t 7! (gm  )(t) is
nonpositive, and so the map is nonincreasing. In particular, since at t = 0 we have
(gm  )(t) = gm(q)  u2, this same inequality holds for all t  0. 
Assertion 5. For any p 2 X[u1;u2] such that u < gm(p)  u2 the inequality
(u  gm(p))rf(p)  V (p) < 0
holds true.
Proof. Since u   gm(p) < 0, we only need to prove that rgm(p)  V (p) > 0. By
Assertion 2, this scalar product is always nonnegative and it is zero precisely when p
is a critical point of gmjX . Now, the choice of u1 and u2 guarantees that the critical
points that gmjY may have in the set X[u1;u2] are all contained in Xu. Since p 62 Xu,
the assertion follows. 
Assertion 6. gm((t))! u as t! +1.
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Proof. Notice that t 7! (gm  )(t) must indeed converge to some u as t ! +1
because according to the computation in Assertion 4 it is a monotonous nonincreasing
function bounded below by u. Let us assume that u is strictly larger than u and
arrive at a contradiction.
Set D(p) = (u  gm(p))rgm(p)  V (p) for brevity. Let Xu = fp 2 Y : gm(p) = ug.
This set is closed in Y , so it is compact. Also, the previous assertion says that
D(p) < 0 for every q 2 Xu . Since Xu is compact and D is continuous, there is
an  < 0 such that D(p) <  for every p 2 Xu . In fact, more is true: there is a
neighbourhood U of Xu in X[u1;u2] where the same inequality holds; that is, D(p) < 
for every p 2 U .
We are almost nished. Since gm((t)) ! u as t ! +1, there exists T > 0 such
that (t) 2 U for every t > T . By the mean value theorem, for any t there exists t
between t and t+ 1 such that
(3) gm((t+ 1))  gm((t)) = d
dt
(gm  )(t) = D((t));
where in the last equality we have used equation (2). Let us consider what happens
in the above expression when t! +1. Since t lies between t and t + 1, as soon as
t > T we also have t > T and therefore (t) 2 U , which entails D((t)) < . Thus
the right hand side of (3) is bounded away from 0 (recall that  < 0). However, its
left hand side converges to 0 as t ! +1 because both summands converge to u.
This contradiction nishes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 14. (1) We have seen that for an initial condition q = (0) satis-
fying u < gm(q)  u2, the trajectory (t) remains in the set fp 2 Y : u < gm(p)  u2g
for every t  0. Evidently, if the initial condition q satises u1  gm(q) < u, similar
arguments show that (t) remains in the set fp 2 Y : u1  gm(p) < ug for all t  0.
The remaining case, gm(q) = u, is very simple: q is then a zero of the vectoreld W
and so (t) = q for every t 2 R. Summing up, for an initial condition q 2 X[u1;u2]
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the trajectory  remains in the set X[u1;u2]. Part (1) of the proposition is just a re-
statement of this, since in terms of the ow the trajectory  with initial condition
q = (0) is simply (t) = '(q; t).
(2) Find u01 and u
0
2 such that u1 < u
0
1 < u < u
0
2 < u2 and X[u01;u02]  U . In
accordance with the notation we have been using so far, denote
X(u01;u02) = fp 2 Y : u01 < gm(p) < u02g;
which is an open subset of X[u1;u2] by continuity of gm. In fact it is a neighbourhood
of Xu in X[u1;u2], so by Assertion 6 for each q 2 X[u1;u2] there exists tq  0 such
that '(q; tq) 2 X(u01;u02). Now the continuity of ' guarantees that q has an open
neighbourhood Uq in X[u1;u2] such that '(Uq  ftqg)  X(u01;u02). In particular '(Uq 
ftqg)  X[u01;u02], and by part (1) of this proposition (applied to X[u01;u02] rather than
X[u1;u2]) we see that '(Uqftg)  X[u01;u02] for every t  tq. The Uq cover the compact
set X[u1;u2], so a nite family of them cover it too, say Uq1 ; Uq2 ; : : : ; Uqr . Let T be the
maximum of tq1 ; tq2 ; : : : ; tqr . Then whenever t  T we have that '(q; t) 2 X[u01;u02] for
every t 2 X[u1;u2], proving the proposition. 
We are nally ready to prove Lemma 11. For the convenience of the reader, we
restate it here:
Lemma. Given any neighbourhood U of Xu in X[u1;u2] there exists a continuous map-
ping r : X[u1;u2]  ! X[u1;u2] such that:
(1) r(p) 2 U for every p 2 X[u1;u2],
(2) r is homotopic to the identity in X[u1;u2].
Proof. According to Proposition 14 there exists T  0 such that '(p; t) 2 U for every
p 2 X[u1;u2] and every t  T . Let r be dened by r(p) := '(p; T ). By construction
r(p) 2 U , so indeed satises condition (1). Also, r is homotopic to the identity:
the ow '(p; t), for 0  t  T , provides a suitable homotopy. Thus the lemma is
proved. 
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7. Concluding remarks
Many of the sets of interest in economics are naturally described as subsets of Eu-
clidean space dened by a number of constraints. Solving the social choice problem
over such a set X can be very hard even with the aid of the classical characteriza-
tion of Chichilnisky and Heal (i.e., that X should be contractible) because: (i) the
contractibility condition is probably unfamiliar to someone without a specic mathe-
matical background in topology, (ii) deciding whether a given set X is contractible is
in general very dicult, and even more so because describingX in terms of constraints
makes it dicult to gain any geometric intuition about it.
Motivated by this, we have provided several criteria that are easy to check and solve
the social choice problem over sets X dened in terms of constraints. Besides their
practical use, these criteria also have two interesting theoretical consequences. The
rst one is that, generically, the social choice problem over a set X dened by equality
constraints gi(~x) = ci has no solution. Thus, if the constraints gi come from some
natural or random process (in a nontechnical sense of the word), with probability one
the social choice problem over X will have no solution. In fact (and this is the second
consequence), the ci have to be very nely tuned indeed if we want a social choice
function over X to exist: namely, one of the ci has to be either the global maximum
or the global minimum of its constraint gi over the set of alternatives dened by the
remaining constraints gj = cj, j 6= i. Thus, if one of the constraint values is not
xed but can be operated upon by some agent, it must be carefully chosen to be a
global optimum. We call this the principle of rational design. In this sense, the only
way to avoid a social choice paradox consists in designing the set of alternatives (if
possible) in a way that is natural in economics. An interesting point to observe here is
that the need for optimization emerges unexpectedly and not as a consequence of any
assumption concerning rationality, utility functions, or any other element related to
economics, of which there are none in the social choice problem under consideration.
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